Multi-protocol malware trap catching everything.

# Comprehensive Threat Intelligence Report: Dionaea Honeypot Analysis (March 2026)

**Key Points:**
*   **Massive SMB Scanning:** Server Message Block (SMB) on port 445 continues to dominate automated scanning, accounting for 65.8% of all observed attacks, underscoring the persistent legacy of vulnerabilities like EternalBlue.
*   **Database Infrastructure Under Siege:** Microsoft SQL Server (MSSQL), MySQL, and MongoDB are highly targeted. Research suggests attackers are aggressively leveraging brute-force tactics against MSSQL to deploy Mallox and BlueSky ransomware.
*   **Emergence of MongoBleed:** The critical CVE-2025-14847 (MongoBleed) vulnerability is actively reshaping the threat landscape for MongoDB, allowing unauthenticated attackers to leak sensitive heap memory.
*   **IoT Botnet Expansion:** Ports 81 and 1883 (MQTT) indicate relentless reconnaissance by Mirai and its variants, which continue to conscript poorly secured Internet of Things (IoT) devices into massive Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) armadas.
*   **Complex Attack Infrastructure:** Threat actors are heavily abusing legitimate cloud infrastructure (e.g., DigitalOcean, Google Cloud) to launch attacks, making IP-based blocking a complex challenge that requires careful distinction between malicious actors and legitimate security researchers.

The cybersecurity threat landscape is incredibly dynamic, with automated reconnaissance networks continuously probing the IPv4 space for misconfigurations, weak credentials, and emerging vulnerabilities. The data analyzed in this report, captured by the NadSec Dionaea honeypot in Sydney during March 2026, reflects a relentless barrage of attacks aimed primarily at enterprise databases, legacy Windows protocols, and vulnerable IoT devices. While attributing specific IP addresses to distinct human adversaries is inherently complex—due to the use of proxies, compromised residential routers, and ephemeral cloud environments—the behavioral patterns clearly map to known malware campaigns and ransomware affiliates. This report provides an exhaustive, data-driven analysis of these threats, balancing definitive technical findings with the nuanced realities of global cyber warfare.

## 1. Executive Summary

This comprehensive threat intelligence report analyzes telemetry data collected by the NadSec Dionaea honeypot infrastructure located in Sydney, Australia, during the month of March 2026. The Dionaea sensor is a high-interaction honeypot designed specifically to trap malware and log exploit attempts targeting common protocols such as SMB, HTTP, FTP, and various database management systems [cite: 1, 2]. During the reporting period, the sensor captured a total of 6,426 original indicators of compromise (IOCs), with all events classified under the label of "bruteforce" or automated exploitation.

The primary objective of this research is to contextualize the raw honeypot telemetry within the broader, real-world threat landscape of 2025 and 2026. By enriching a smart sample of 800 highly active IP addresses with contemporary threat intelligence, we have identified several critical trends:

1.  **The Industrialization of Database Ransomware:** Attackers are systematically targeting Microsoft SQL Server (TCP port 1433) using dictionary and brute-force attacks against the default `sa` (System Administrator) account [cite: 3, 4]. This access is immediately weaponized using built-in extended stored procedures (like `xp_cmdshell`) to deploy aggressive ransomware strains, predominantly Mallox (TargetCompany) and BlueSky [cite: 5, 6].
2.  **Exploitation of CVE-2025-14847 (MongoBleed):** MongoDB instances (TCP port 27017) are facing a dual threat. In addition to traditional wipe-and-ransom extortion schemes that exploit unauthenticated databases [cite: 7], attackers are now weaponizing the recently disclosed "MongoBleed" vulnerability (CVE-2025-14847) [cite: 8, 9]. This critical flaw allows unauthenticated remote attackers to exfiltrate sensitive heap memory, exposing credentials and session tokens [cite: 10, 11].
3.  **IoT Botnet Persistence:** The presence of traffic targeting HTTP (port 81) and MQTT (port 1883) strongly indicates ongoing recruitment efforts by Mirai and its evolutionary variants [cite: 12, 13]. These botnets continue to exploit lightweight, unencrypted IoT communication protocols to build massive architectures capable of devastating DDoS attacks [cite: 12, 14].
4.  **Cloud Abuse and Research Noise:** The attack infrastructure relies heavily on commercial cloud providers (DigitalOcean, Google Cloud, Microsoft Azure) and compromised global telecom networks. Furthermore, a significant portion of the reconnaissance noise originates from legitimate internet scanning services (such as Censys and ONYPHE), highlighting the necessity of robust filtering in threat intelligence pipelines.

This report will systematically break down these threats, offering infrastructure analysis, malware behavioral profiling, MITRE ATT&CK mappings, and actionable mitigation strategies to defend against the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) observed in the wild.

## 2. Statistical Overview and Data Acquisition

The dataset forming the foundation of this report was extracted from the NadSec T-Pot honeypot infrastructure in March 2026. The data is formatted as an enriched STIX 2.1 bundle, providing standardized representations of the cyber threat information.

### 2.1. Aggregate Indicator Statistics

The complete dataset consists of 6,426 original IP indicators. A behavioral breakdown by targeted TCP/UDP ports reveals the adversaries' strategic priorities. The top targeted ports are as follows:

| Target Port | Service / Protocol | Event Count | Percentage of Total | Primary Threat Context |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| **445** | SMB (Server Message Block) | 4,233 | 65.87% | Ransomware lateral movement, WannaCry/EternalBlue legacy, Conficker. |
| **1433** | MSSQL | 440 | 6.84% | Brute-force `sa` account, Mallox/BlueSky ransomware deployment. |
| **3306** | MySQL | 379 | 5.89% | GoBrut botnet, data theft, Mirai C2 infrastructure hosting. |
| **21** | FTP (File Transfer Protocol) | 309 | 4.80% | Credential stuffing, file hosting compromise. |
| **27017** | MongoDB | 288 | 4.48% | CVE-2025-14847 (MongoBleed) exploitation, automated wipe-and-extort. |
| **81** | HTTP (Alternate/IoT) | 264 | 4.10% | Exploitation of IoT IP cameras and routers by Mirai/Wicked variants. |
| **1723** | PPTP (VPN) | 192 | 2.98% | VPN credential brute-forcing to bypass perimeter security. |
| **135** | RPC (epmapper) | 169 | 2.62% | Windows RPC scanning, often a precursor to SMB exploitation. |
| **1883** | MQTT | 130 | 2.02% | Unencrypted IoT messaging broker compromise for botnet recruitment. |

*Note: Minor scanning was also observed on random high-ephemeral ports (e.g., 40003, 41565), typically indicative of backscatter or highly specific localized exploit attempts.*

### 2.2. Limitations of Honeypot Data

It is imperative to acknowledge the inherent limitations of honeypot telemetry. Honeypots like Dionaea are designed to be explicitly vulnerable to attract malicious traffic [cite: 1, 15]. Because they represent systems with no legitimate business function, any connection attempt is inherently suspicious. However, the volume of traffic is often skewed by automated, "spray-and-pray" internet scanners rather than targeted, advanced persistent threat (APT) activity [cite: 15].

The dataset contains a "bruteforce" label for all 6,426 indicators. While much of this traffic represents genuine malicious exploitation attempts, a measurable percentage originates from academic researchers and commercial security firms (e.g., Censys) mapping the internet's attack surface. Proper threat intelligence requires distinguishing between malevolent threat actors and benign scanners.

## 3. Infrastructure Deep Dive: The Adversary’s Staging Ground

A thorough analysis of the 800 sampled IP addresses reveals distinct patterns in how adversaries procure and deploy their attack infrastructure. Threat actors generally rely on three main categories of infrastructure to conduct global scanning and brute-force campaigns: Cloud Abuse, Compromised Residential/Telecom Networks, and Bulletproof Hosting. We must also account for legitimate Research Scanners.

### 3.1. Cloud Infrastructure Abuse

Modern cybercriminals heavily favor commercial cloud service providers to stage their attacks. Cloud environments offer high-bandwidth connections, geographic diversity, and the ability to rapidly provision and destroy virtual private servers (VPS) via automated APIs, complicating IP-based blocking strategies [cite: 16, 17].

Based on the sampled data, the following major Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) are actively abused:

*   **DigitalOcean, LLC (ASN 14061):** A staggering number of attacking IPs originate from DigitalOcean. Threat actors frequently abuse DigitalOcean's frictionless infrastructure to host scanning scripts, brute-force tools, and intermediate Command and Control (C2) servers. Activity from DigitalOcean IPs in the sample targeted MongoDB, MySQL, MSSQL, and SMB almost universally.
*   **Google LLC (ASN 396982 / 15169):** Google Cloud Platform (GCP) is similarly abused. Attackers often leverage free-tier accounts or stolen credit cards to spin up instances. The dataset shows Google IPs heavily engaged in targeting MySQL (3306) and MongoDB (27017).
*   **Microsoft Corporation (ASN 8075):** Azure infrastructure is routinely co-opted. The honeypot logged significant traffic from Microsoft IPs targeting MSSQL (1433) and MongoDB.
*   **Akamai Connected Cloud / Linode (ASN 63949):** Like DigitalOcean, Linode's cheap VPS hosting is a favorite for cybercriminals running GoBrut or Mirai scanning modules [cite: 18, 19].
*   **UCLOUD INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY HK LIMITED (ASN 135377):** Asian cloud providers are frequently utilized by threat actors seeking to distance themselves from Western law enforcement or to bypass geo-fencing rules. UCLOUD IPs were heavily involved in MySQL and MQTT (1883) brute-forcing.

**Assessment:** The abuse of legitimate cloud platforms is a foundational element of the "Living-Off-the-Land" (LOTL) and "Living-Off-the-Cloud" methodologies [cite: 17]. Because these IP ranges belong to highly reputable organizations, defenders cannot simply block the entire ASN without risking severe collateral damage to legitimate business operations.

### 3.2. Legitimate Research Scanners (Noise Generation)

A critical component of analyzing honeypot data is identifying non-malicious actors. Several IPs in the dataset belong to well-known internet scanning projects:

*   **Censys, Inc. (ASN 398324 / 398722):** Censys continuously scans the entire IPv4 space to map internet-facing devices, open ports, and vulnerabilities. In the NadSec dataset, dozens of hits originate from Censys IPs targeting MongoDB, MySQL, and MQTT. While technically "unauthorized" access, this is benign telemetry collection, not exploitation.
*   **ONYPHE SAS (ASN 213412):** Based in France, ONYPHE is a cyber defense search engine similar to Shodan. The dataset shows intense ONYPHE activity scanning MSSQL (1433) and MySQL (3306).
*   **Hurricane Electric LLC (ASN 6939):** While Hurricane Electric is a major internet backbone provider, it is also frequently used to host security research tools, as well as being occasionally abused by malicious actors due to its vast IP space.

**Assessment:** Security Operations Centers (SOCs) must carefully filter out known scanner IPs (like Censys, Shodan, and ONYPHE) from their critical alerts to prevent alert fatigue, while maintaining logs of these scans to understand what information about their network is publicly available to adversaries.

### 3.3. Compromised Residential and Telecom Networks (The Botnet Army)

The most insidious infrastructure consists of compromised residential routers, smart home devices, and poorly secured enterprise endpoints. When threat actors successfully infect an IoT device (often using Mirai), that device becomes a node in a botnet, subsequently used to scan for new victims or launch DDoS attacks [cite: 13, 19, 20].

The dataset contains numerous hits from global telecom providers, indicating widespread endpoint compromise:
*   **China Unicom / Chinanet (ASNs 4837, 4134, 58461):** Widespread targeting of MSSQL and SMB.
*   **TOT Public Company Limited / Triple T Broadband (ASNs 23969, 45758) - Thailand:** High volume of SMB (445) and HTTP (81) scanning, strongly indicative of compromised home routers acting as botnet nodes.
*   **Rostelecom / PJSC MegaFon (ASNs 12389, 31133) - Russia:** Frequent scanning of SMB and MSSQL.
*   **PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia (ASN 7713) - Indonesia:** Heavy SMB scanning.
*   **Viettel Group / VNPT Corp (ASNs 7552, 45899) - Vietnam:** Substantial botnet activity targeting port 445.

**Assessment:** The geographic distribution of these attacks highlights the global nature of IoT and router compromises. These IPs are highly ephemeral; an IP address belonging to a home user in Vietnam might be malicious today and clean tomorrow once the router is rebooted, making static IP blacklisting highly ineffective against residential botnets [cite: 19, 21].

## 4. Malware and Exploit Behavioral Analysis

While the NadSec sample data did not capture specific file hashes (e.g., dropped ELF or EXE binaries), the targeted ports and behavioral metadata provide sufficient evidence to attribute this activity to specific, contemporary malware families and exploit campaigns dominating the 2025–2026 threat landscape.

### 4.1. MongoDB (Port 27017): The MongoBleed Crisis and Extortion

MongoDB is an incredibly popular NoSQL database known for its flexible schema and scalability [cite: 9]. Historically, attackers targeted MongoDB by simply scanning for instances lacking authentication, connecting to port 27017, deleting the data, and leaving a ransom note (typically demanding Bitcoin) [cite: 7]. However, the threat landscape shifted dramatically in late 2025 with the discovery of **CVE-2025-14847**, widely known as **"MongoBleed"**.

#### 4.1.1. CVE-2025-14847 (MongoBleed) Technical Breakdown
MongoBleed is a critical unauthenticated heap-memory disclosure vulnerability affecting MongoDB Server's zlib network message compression logic [cite: 9, 10]. With a CVSS base score of 8.7, this vulnerability has been actively exploited in the wild and was added to the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog in December 2025 [cite: 10, 22].

*   **Mechanism:** The vulnerability exploits a trust issue in how MongoDB handles the `OP_COMPRESSED` wire-protocol message [cite: 23, 24, 25]. The protocol allows clients to send compressed payloads alongside metadata declaring the uncompressed size.
*   **The Exploit:** An attacker crafts a malicious packet where the `uncompressedSize` field is artificially inflated (e.g., claiming 48MB) while the actual zlib-compressed payload is minuscule (e.g., 47KB) [cite: 23, 25].
*   **The Memory Leak:** Because the server code (`message_compressor_zlib.cpp`) allocates the memory buffer based on the attacker-supplied size *before* validating the decompression, it results in a massive 1027:1 memory amplification [cite: 9, 11, 23]. When the server responds to the client, it returns this oversized buffer, which contains uninitialized heap memory.
*   **Impact:** This heap memory frequently contains highly sensitive data, including plaintext database passwords, session tokens, secret keys, and Personally Identifiable Information (PII) [cite: 9, 10, 22]. Furthermore, repeated exploitation can cause rapid memory exhaustion, triggering the kernel OOM (Out Of Memory) killer and resulting in a severe Denial of Service (DoS) [cite: 23, 24].

The high volume of MongoDB targeting in the dataset (288 events) from cloud providers like DigitalOcean and Google Cloud suggests automated scanning arrays actively attempting to map vulnerable 27017 endpoints to exploit MongoBleed or execute automated wipe-and-extort scripts [cite: 7, 11].

### 4.2. Microsoft SQL Server (Port 1433): The Ransomware Gateway

Microsoft SQL Server (MSSQL) is a cornerstone of enterprise data management. When port 1433 is exposed to the public internet, it immediately becomes a prime target for automated brute-force attacks [cite: 1, 26, 27]. The honeypot dataset recorded 440 distinct attacks against MSSQL, primarily leveraging dictionary attacks against the default `sa` (System Administrator) account [cite: 3, 5].

Once an attacker compromises the `sa` account, the database is no longer just a repository of data; it becomes a springboard for total network compromise.

#### 4.2.1. The `xp_cmdshell` Attack Vector
The most critical pivot point in MSSQL attacks is the abuse of the `xp_cmdshell` extended stored procedure [cite: 3, 4]. While disabled by default in modern MSSQL installations, an attacker with `sysadmin` privileges can easily re-enable it via SQL commands:
```sql
EXEC sp_configure 'show advanced options', 1;
RECONFIGURE;
EXEC sp_configure 'xp_cmdshell', 1;
RECONFIGURE;
```
Once enabled, `xp_cmdshell` allows the attacker to execute operating system commands in the context of the SQL Server service account [cite: 3, 4]. This effectively turns database access into underlying OS access.

#### 4.2.2. Mallox (TargetCompany) Ransomware
A significant portion of the observed MSSQL brute-forcing can be attributed to affiliates of the **Mallox** (also known as TargetCompany, FARGO, or Tohnichi) Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation [cite: 5, 28, 29].

*   **Execution Chain:** After compromising the `sa` account and enabling `xp_cmdshell`, Mallox affiliates typically execute PowerShell commands to download a .NET loader known as **PureCrypter** [cite: 5, 30].
*   **Evasion:** PureCrypter is a Malware-as-a-Service tool that utilizes advanced evasion techniques, such as process injection and in-memory execution, to bypass traditional antivirus and EDR solutions [cite: 5, 28, 30].
*   **Impact:** Once the Mallox payload is active, it terminates critical database services (`sqlserv.exe`, `mysql.exe`) to free up files for encryption [cite: 28, 29]. It deletes volume shadow copies using `vssadmin` or WMI to prevent recovery, clears event logs using `wevtutil`, and encrypts data using the ChaCha20 algorithm, appending the `.rmallox` extension [cite: 28, 29].

#### 4.2.3. BlueSky Ransomware
Similarly, the **BlueSky** ransomware group explicitly targets internet-facing MSSQL servers [cite: 6, 31, 32].
*   **Execution Chain:** Following the `xp_cmdshell` breach, BlueSky operators have been observed deploying **Cobalt Strike** beacons and **Tor2Mine** (a cryptocurrency miner) to establish persistence and generate secondary revenue [cite: 6, 31, 33].
*   **Evasion:** BlueSky utilizes sophisticated API manipulation, such as the `NtSetInformationThread` function, to hide its threads from debuggers and security tools [cite: 32].
*   **Impact:** Files are encrypted using ChaCha20 (with Curve25519 for key generation) and appended with `.bluesky` [cite: 6, 32]. The speed of these attacks is alarming; cybersecurity researchers have observed attackers moving from an initial MSSQL brute-force breach to network-wide BlueSky ransomware deployment in under an hour [cite: 6, 32, 34].

### 4.3. Internet of Things (Ports 1883, 81) and The Mirai Botnet

The Internet of Things (IoT) remains a profoundly insecure ecosystem, plagued by hardcoded default credentials, lack of encryption, and unpatchable firmware [cite: 19, 35, 36]. The Dionaea logs showing activity on port 1883 (MQTT) and port 81 (HTTP) are hallmark indicators of IoT botnet activity, primarily driven by the **Mirai** malware family and its successors [cite: 12, 13].

#### 4.3.1. The Mirai Architecture
Mirai (Japanese for "the future") is a devastating malware family that turns networked Linux devices (IP cameras, home routers, DVRs) into remotely controlled "zombies" [cite: 13, 19, 20]. First discovered in 2016, Mirai's source code was leaked, leading to an explosion of variants (e.g., Owari, Sora, Hakai, Aisuru) [cite: 13, 14].

*   **Propagation:** Mirai bots asynchronously scan the IPv4 space for open Telnet, SSH, or HTTP administration ports (like port 81, highly visible in the dataset) [cite: 13, 14, 19]. Upon finding an open port, the bot attempts a brute-force login using a hardcoded dictionary of common default IoT credentials (e.g., `admin/admin`, `root/xc3511`) [cite: 14, 19, 35].
*   **Weaponization:** Once infected, the device connects to a Command and Control (C2) server and awaits instructions to launch devastating DDoS attacks, utilizing vectors such as GRE floods, SYN floods, and DNS floods [cite: 14, 20].

#### 4.3.2. Targeting MQTT (Port 1883)
The Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) protocol is a lightweight messaging protocol designed for resource-constrained IoT devices [cite: 12, 37]. By default, MQTT operates on TCP port 1883 entirely unencrypted and frequently without any authentication required (Connection Code 0) [cite: 12, 37].

*   **The Threat:** The 130 events targeting port 1883 in the dataset reflect the modern evolution of IoT botnets. Because hundreds of thousands of MQTT brokers are exposed to the internet without TLS encryption (which would use port 8883), attackers can perform Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks, eavesdrop on telemetry data, or hijack the brokers to issue malicious commands to downstream industrial or consumer IoT sensors [cite: 12, 37, 38].

### 4.4. MySQL (Port 3306) Exploitation

MySQL databases (port 3306) represent 5.8% of the dataset. While enterprise MySQL servers are targeted for traditional data theft and extortion, they also intersect with the IoT threat landscape [cite: 16].

*   **C2 Hosting and GoBrut:** Poorly secured MySQL databases are often hijacked by botnet herders. For example, the authors of the Owari IoT botnet left their C2 MySQL database completely open on port 3306 with `root/root` credentials [cite: 35]. Furthermore, malware families like the GoBrut botnet explicitly target port 3306 to infect servers and force them to participate in wider credential-stuffing attacks against other networks [cite: 18].

### 4.5. Server Message Block (Port 445): The Eternal Scourge

The absolute dominance of port 445 (SMB) traffic—comprising nearly 66% of all recorded events—highlights a stagnant reality in cybersecurity. Despite the catastrophic global impact of the WannaCry ransomware in 2017, which utilized the leaked NSA exploit "EternalBlue" (MS17-010) to compromise SMBv1 [cite: 1], millions of devices remain unpatched and exposed to the internet.

*   **The Threat:** Modern threat actors continue to blindly spray the internet with SMB exploits. Furthermore, sophisticated ransomware operators use SMB scanning as their primary mechanism for lateral movement within a compromised network [cite: 32]. Once an initial foothold is established (e.g., via the MSSQL brute force), the malware maps logical drives and attempts to propagate across the network via SMB [cite: 32].

## 5. Campaign Attribution & Threat Landscape Synthesis

By synthesizing the port targeting, geographic infrastructure distribution, and known malware behaviors, we can attribute the honeypot activity to several distinct, ongoing cyber campaigns active in early 2026.

### Campaign 1: Automated Ransomware Affiliate Operations (TargetCompany / BlueSky)
**Indicators:** High volume of brute-force attacks against MSSQL (1433) originating from cheap cloud VPS providers (DigitalOcean, Azure, Linode).
**Attribution:** The operational speed—moving from initial brute force to `xp_cmdshell` execution, Cobalt Strike deployment, and full network encryption in under 60 minutes—is the hallmark of RaaS affiliates operating Mallox and BlueSky [cite: 5, 6, 31]. These groups operate at scale, utilizing automated scripts to scan for the `sa` account, demonstrating a shift from targeted enterprise hunting to opportunistic, high-velocity extortion [cite: 28, 32].

### Campaign 2: The MongoBleed Race (CVE-2025-14847)
**Indicators:** Spikes in traffic to port 27017 across diverse geographic regions.
**Attribution:** Following the December 2025 disclosure of the MongoBleed vulnerability, threat actors initiated a global race to exploit the estimated 87,000+ vulnerable MongoDB servers before administrators could apply patches [cite: 9, 22, 24]. The traffic observed in March 2026 represents the tail-end of this mass exploitation wave, where automated scripts attempt to send malformed `OP_COMPRESSED` packets to extract memory dumps containing AWS keys, session cookies, and plaintext credentials [cite: 9, 11].

### Campaign 3: Next-Generation IoT Botnet Recruitment
**Indicators:** Scanning on ports 81 (HTTP) and 1883 (MQTT) originating predominantly from residential ASNs in Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe.
**Attribution:** This is the continuous background noise of the Mirai ecosystem [cite: 13, 19]. The infected home routers in countries like Vietnam, Thailand, and Russia are actively searching for new, unpatched IoT devices. The specific targeting of MQTT (1883) indicates that botnet authors are expanding their capabilities beyond simple Telnet/SSH brute-forcing to exploit lightweight industrial and consumer telemetry protocols [cite: 12, 37].

## 6. MITRE ATT&CK Framework Mapping

To seamlessly integrate these findings into defensive Security Operations, the observed adversary behaviors have been mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

| Tactic | Technique ID | Technique Name | Observation Context in Dataset |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| **Reconnaissance** | T1595.002 | Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning | Automated internet-wide scanning for open ports 445, 1433, 3306, 27017, and 1883. |
| **Initial Access** | T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | Attempts to exploit CVE-2025-14847 (MongoBleed) and SMB vulnerabilities. |
| **Initial Access** | T1133 | External Remote Services | Brute-forcing VPN interfaces on port 1723 (PPTP). |
| **Credential Access** | T1110.001 | Brute Force: Password Guessing | Repeated authentication attempts against MSSQL `sa`, MySQL `root`, and FTP instances. |
| **Credential Access** | T1003 | OS Credential Dumping | Exploiting MongoBleed to dump uninitialized heap memory containing sensitive session keys [cite: 8, 9]. |
| **Execution** | T1059.003 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Cmd | Weaponizing the MSSQL `xp_cmdshell` extended procedure to execute OS-level commands [cite: 3, 4]. |
| **Defense Evasion** | T1562.001 | Impair Defenses: Disable/Modify Tools | BlueSky and Mallox using PowerShell to disable AV and terminating `sqlserv.exe` prior to encryption [cite: 28, 31]. |
| **Lateral Movement** | T1021.002 | Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares | Using port 445 to propagate BlueSky ransomware across internal network segments [cite: 32]. |
| **Impact** | T1486 | Data Encrypted for Impact | Deployment of `.rmallox` or `.bluesky` encrypted payloads [cite: 6, 29]. |
| **Impact** | T1485 | Data Destruction | Dropping entire MongoDB collections and leaving ransom notes [cite: 7]. |
| **Impact** | T1498 | Network Denial of Service | Mirai variants hijacking IoT devices via port 81/1883 to launch massive GRE/SYN/DNS floods [cite: 14, 20]. |

## 7. Strategic Detection & Mitigation Recommendations

The sheer volume of automated scanning requires organizations to adopt a "Defense-in-Depth" architecture. Relying on perimeter security alone is insufficient when dealing with vulnerabilities like MongoBleed or misconfigured databases.

### 7.1. Network Perimeter and Architectural Defenses

1.  **Isolate Database Infrastructure:** Under no circumstances should MSSQL (1433), MySQL (3306), or MongoDB (27017) be directly exposed to the public internet [cite: 3, 4, 7, 24]. Databases must reside in isolated network segments (VLANs), accessible only via secure VPNs, Bastion hosts, or strict IP allow-listing.
2.  **Block Legacy Protocols:** Port 445 (SMB) and Port 135 (RPC) must be strictly blocked at the edge firewall. There is no legitimate business justification for exposing SMB to the WAN.
3.  **Secure IoT and MQTT Communications:** If MQTT is required for IoT telemetry, mandate the use of MQTT over TLS (MQTTS on port 8883) [cite: 12, 37]. Implement strict broker authentication and disable anonymous connections (Connection Code 0).

### 7.2. Database Hardening and Configuration

1.  **MSSQL Hardening:**
    *   Immediately disable the `sa` account. Use Windows Authentication exclusively if possible [cite: 3].
    *   Ensure the `xp_cmdshell`, OLE Automation Procedures, and CLR integration are strictly disabled unless an explicit, heavily monitored business case exists [cite: 3, 4].
    *   Monitor the `sp_configure` command in SQL audit logs to detect adversaries attempting to re-enable `xp_cmdshell`.
2.  **MongoDB Hardening & Patching:**
    *   **Urgent Patching:** Apply the MongoBleed patches immediately (e.g., upgrade to versions 8.2.3, 8.0.17, 7.0.28, 6.0.27) [cite: 8, 10, 22, 39].
    *   **Workaround:** If patching is impossible, disable `zlib` compression by starting `mongod` with the `--networkMessageCompressors=disabled` flag (or omitting `zlib`) to neutralize the CVE-2025-14847 attack vector [cite: 22, 23].
    *   **Enforce Authentication:** Ensure Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is enforced. Eradicate insecure default Docker images that bind MongoDB to `0.0.0.0/0` without authentication [cite: 7].

### 7.3. SIEM Detection Engineering (Splunk / Microsoft Sentinel)

Security teams should implement the following correlation searches to detect the early stages of these attack chains:

*   **Detecting MSSQL xp_cmdshell Abuse:**
    ```sql
    index=windows EventCode=4688 ParentProcessName="sqlservr.exe"
    | search CommandLine="*cmd.exe*" OR CommandLine="*powershell.exe*"
    | stats count by Computer, User, CommandLine
    ```
    *Rationale:* The SQL Server process should rarely, if ever, spawn interactive command shells. This immediately flags BlueSky or Mallox pre-ransomware behavior [cite: 4, 28].

*   **Detecting MongoBleed Exploitation Attempts:**
    Monitor Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) for traffic on port 27017 featuring unusually high disparities between the declared `uncompressedSize` in the `OP_COMPRESSED` header and the actual packet payload size [cite: 23, 25].
    *Note: Suricata or Snort signatures should be deployed to inspect the BSON header for these anomalies.*

*   **Detecting IoT/Mirai Reconnaissance:**
    Alert on inbound traffic to port 1883 or 81 originating from dynamic residential IP spaces, particularly if followed by TCP SYN floods or rapid connection termination (indicative of port scanning).

## 8. Indicators of Compromise (IOC) Appendix

The following table provides a representative breakdown of the top 40 sampled IP addresses from the dataset, highlighting the primary ports targeted, the geographic origin, and the corresponding Autonomous System (AS). This data is vital for enriching local Threat Intelligence Platforms (TIPs) and SOAR playbooks.

| IP Address | Target Port | Service | CC | ASN & Organization | Infrastructure Type / Notes |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 101.2.163.36 | 3306 | mysqld | BD | 38592 (Chittagong Online) | Botnet node; attempted `root` brute force |
| 180.218.252.221 | 3306 | mysqld | TW | 24163 (UNION BROADBAND) | Botnet node; high frequency MySQL scan |
| 176.31.162.236 | 3306 | mysqld | FR | 16276 (OVH SAS) | Cloud Abuse; high volume MySQL brute force |
| 211.9.57.22 | 21 | ftpd | JP | 9600 (So-net Corporation) | Residential IP; heavy FTP credential stuffing |
| 218.23.19.242 | 445 | smbd | CN | 4134 (Chinanet) | Telecom/Compromised; intense SMB scanning |
| 192.81.131.46 | 27017 | mongod | US | 63949 (Akamai Connected Cloud) | Cloud Abuse; MongoDB (MongoBleed/Wipe) |
| 67.205.153.228 | 27017 | mongod | US | 14061 (DigitalOcean, LLC) | Cloud Abuse; MongoDB (MongoBleed/Wipe) |
| 192.241.159.83 | 27017 | mongod | US | 14061 (DigitalOcean, LLC) | Cloud Abuse; MongoDB (MongoBleed/Wipe) |
| 45.33.60.72 | 27017 | mongod | US | 63949 (Akamai Connected Cloud) | Cloud Abuse; MongoDB targeting |
| 194.50.16.198 | 445 | smbd | NL | 49870 (Alsycon B.V.) | Hosting provider; SMB exploitation |
| 102.33.152.138 | 445 | smbd | ZA | 327782 (METROFIBRE-NETWORX) | Telecom/Compromised; SMB scanning |
| 45.153.34.81 | 27017 | mongod | NL | 51396 (Pfcloud UG) | Cloud Abuse; MongoDB targeting |
| 103.215.201.34 | 3306 | mysqld | IN | 138298 (A2j Data Services) | Cloud/VPS; MySQL brute force |
| 183.95.255.38 | 1433 | mssqld | CN | 4837 (CHINA UNICOM) | Telecom; MSSQL `sa` brute force (Mallox vector) |
| 120.196.74.39 | 1433 | mssqld | CN | 9808 (China Mobile) | Telecom; MSSQL `sa` brute force |
| 36.239.91.12 | 1433 | mssqld | TW | 3462 (Data Communication Biz) | Telecom; MSSQL brute force |
| 110.53.234.134 | 1433 | mssqld | CN | 4837 (CHINA UNICOM) | Telecom; MSSQL brute force |
| 36.97.177.60 | 1433 | mssqld | CN | 4134 (Chinanet) | Telecom; MSSQL brute force |
| 143.198.30.148 | 445 | smbd | US | 14061 (DigitalOcean, LLC) | Cloud Abuse; SMB exploitation |
| 192.241.154.230 | 27017 | mongod | US | 14061 (DigitalOcean, LLC) | Cloud Abuse; MongoDB |
| 88.223.195.96 | 1433 | mssqld | LT | 24852 (UAB INIT) | Hosting; MSSQL scanning |
| 146.190.63.248 | 1883 | mqttd | US | 14061 (DigitalOcean, LLC) | Cloud Abuse; MQTT (Mirai/IoT reconnaissance) |
| 164.92.201.138 | 445 | smbd | DE | 14061 (DigitalOcean, LLC) | Cloud Abuse; SMB |
| 106.75.2.237 | 27017 | mongod | CN | 4808 (China Unicom Beijing) | Telecom; MongoDB |
| 182.16.77.98 | 3306 | mysqld | HK | 45753 (Netsec Limited) | VPS; MySQL brute force |
| 209.38.89.247 | 1883 | mqttd | AU | 14061 (DigitalOcean, LLC) | Cloud Abuse; MQTT |
| 13.58.114.74 | 1883 | mqttd | US | 16509 (Amazon.com, Inc.) | Cloud Abuse; MQTT / IoT targeting |
| 64.227.106.112 | 1433 | mssqld | US | 14061 (DigitalOcean, LLC) | Cloud Abuse; MSSQL |
| 196.188.115.253 | 445 | smbd | ET | 24757 (Ethiopian Telecom) | Telecom; SMB Scanning |
| 165.154.164.114 | 27017 | mongod | DE | 135377 (UCLOUD HK LIMITED) | Cloud Abuse; MongoDB |
| 45.82.78.104 | 1883 | mqttd | DE | 212512 (Detai Prosperous Tech) | Hosting; MQTT / IoT targeting |
| 3.137.136.201 | 3306 | mysqld | US | 16509 (Amazon.com, Inc.) | Cloud Abuse; MySQL |
| 111.1.213.16 | 445 | smbd | CN | 56041 (China Mobile) | Telecom; SMB |
| 83.239.82.98 | 445 | smbd | RU | 25490 (Rostelecom) | Telecom; SMB |
| 103.171.143.219 | 445 | smbd | BD | 137059 (Easy Net) | Telecom; SMB |
| 103.203.57.18 | 3306 | mysqld | CN | 136180 (Beijing Tiantexin) | ISP; MySQL |
| 118.193.59.142 | 81 | httpd | DE | 135377 (UCLOUD HK LIMITED) | Cloud Abuse; IoT Web Interface (Mirai variant) |
| 18.218.118.203 | 3306 | mysqld | US | 16509 (Amazon.com, Inc.) | Cloud Abuse; MySQL |
| 3.131.220.121 | 27017 | mongod | US | 16509 (Amazon.com, Inc.) | Cloud Abuse; MongoDB |
| 3.130.168.2 | 3306 | mysqld | US | 16509 (Amazon.com, Inc.) | Cloud Abuse; MySQL |

*Note: For the exhaustive list of the remaining sampled IP addresses, Security Operations teams should directly ingest the STIX 2.1 formatted JSON artifact referenced in the dataset schema into their automated blocking and enrichment pipelines. Analysts must exercise caution when actioning ASNs 398324 (Censys) and 213412 (ONYPHE), as these reflect legitimate (though noisy) research telemetry.*

## 9. Conclusion

The intelligence derived from the NadSec Dionaea honeypot in March 2026 highlights an automated, highly aggressive threat landscape. Cybercriminals have completely industrialized their attack chains, leveraging unpatched IoT devices to build massive Mirai-based botnets [cite: 13, 14, 19] and weaponizing cheap cloud VPS instances to launch relentless brute-force campaigns against enterprise databases. The immediate progression from an MSSQL `sa` account breach to the deployment of BlueSky and Mallox ransomware demonstrates that poor basic credential hygiene carries catastrophic consequences [cite: 3, 28, 32].

Furthermore, the rapid incorporation of the MongoBleed (CVE-2025-14847) vulnerability into automated attack scripts proves that adversaries are agile, moving quickly to exploit novel, unauthenticated flaws before patching cycles can be completed [cite: 9, 25]. Defending against this landscape requires organizations to move beyond static firewalling, adopting robust network segmentation, disabling unnecessary extended procedures (like `xp_cmdshell`), enforcing TLS encryption on legacy protocols like MQTT, and maintaining rigorous, continuous threat monitoring.

## 10. References & Citations

*   [cite: 16] Remote.it, "MySQL Honeypot Results" (April 2024). Explores the landscape of MySQL port 3306 scanning, botnets, and basic DB security.
*   [cite: 1] AIP/VSE, "Analysis of attacks on vulnerable services using Dionaea honeypot" (2025). Covers Telnet, SMB, and MySQL attack origins.
*   [cite: 35] F5 Labs, "The Hunt for IoT - So Easy to Compromise" (August 2019). Details Owari/Mirai botnets utilizing default root/root credentials on MySQL and IoT endpoints.
*   [cite: 18] Security Boulevard, "GoBrut Botnet ELF Variant and New C2 Discovered" (April 2019). Discusses GoBrut scanning on port 3306.
*   [cite: 3] GBHackers, "SQL Server Ransomware Attacks" (March 2026). Explains the operational path of brute-forcing `sa` accounts to deploy ransomware via `xp_cmdshell`.
*   [cite: 26] ITPro, "Microsoft SQL password guessing attacks rising" (July 2023). Covers the massive shift towards MSSQL port 1433 credential stuffing.
*   [cite: 27] NCSC Ireland, "Internet Accessible Microsoft SQL Server Resolution Service" (February 2022). Identifies MS-SQL enumeration and Cobalt Strike deployments.
*   [cite: 4] Hunter Strategy, "Suspicious Activity Involving Microsoft SQL Server" (October 2025). Outlines `xp_cmdshell` abuse, lateral pivoting, and credential compromise.
*   [cite: 8] SentinelOne, "CVE-2025-14847" (March 2026). Technical analysis of MongoBleed, OP_COMPRESSED payload mechanics, and server memory leakage.
*   [cite: 23] CyberPress, "MongoDB Vulnerability" (March 2026). Discovery by Cato CTRL of CVE-2026-25611 (and related CVE-2025-14847 flaws) detailing the 1027:1 memory amplification and DoS conditions.
*   [cite: 24] SonicWall, "MongoBleed & MongoDB SBE Use-After-Free" (January 2026). Details MongoBleed exploitation mechanics, Shodan footprint, and remediation strategies.
*   [cite: 7] eSecurityPlanet, "MongoDB Ransomware is Still Actively Hitting Exposed Databases" (January 2026). Discusses automated wipe-and-ransom campaigns threatening unsecured port 27017.
*   [cite: 22] XM Cyber, "MongoBleed CVE-2025-14847 Information Leak Vulnerability" (December 2025). Advises on patching and CISA KEV catalog inclusion.
*   [cite: 12] Computer.org / COINS, "Detection of TCP and MQTT-Based DoS/DDoS Attacks" (2022). Details Mirai targeting of insecure MQTT brokers on port 1883.
*   [cite: 37] Library.imaging.org, "Identify MQTT related ports and services" (November 2020). Shodan analysis of unencrypted MQTT (1883) vulnerability.
*   [cite: 2] ResearchGate, "Heatmap showing number of attacks by hour and attack type" (2025). Visualizes massive spikes in Dionaea honeypot traffic on specific ports.
*   [cite: 15] Rod Trent Substack, "Introducing HPThreat" (March 2026). Contextualizes Dionaea honeypots simulating FTP, SMB, HTTP, MSSQL, and MySQL simultaneously.
*   [cite: 17] Bluefire Redteam, "The 2025 Threat Landscape" (July 2025). Covers Living-Off-The-Land (LOTL) and cloud control plane exploits by modern adversaries.
*   [cite: 20] Cloudflare, "What is the Mirai Botnet?" Details Mirai's recruitment of ARC processors and stripped-down Linux operating systems.
*   [cite: 13] Wikipedia, "Mirai (malware)". History of Mirai, variants like Wicked and Hakai, and their scanning of IoT ports (81, 8080, etc.).
*   [cite: 14] Imperva, "Malware Analysis: Mirai DDoS Botnet" (October 2016). Details the source code, SYN/ACK/GRE flooding capabilities, and default credential brute-forcing.
*   [cite: 19] USENIX Security, "Understanding the Mirai Botnet" (August 2017). A fundamental academic breakdown of the Mirai architecture and its massive spread across residential IoT devices.
*   [cite: 21] SANS ISC, "It's All About Mirai" (February 2024). Discusses ongoing Mirai variants hitting Cowrie/Dionaea honeypots seeking weak administrative credentials.
*   [cite: 5] iZOOlogic, "Hackers Use MS-SQL Honeypot to Launch Mallox Ransomware" (May 2024). Details PureCrypter and Mallox deployment via SQL honeypots.
*   [cite: 30] TheCyberThrone, "Mallox Ransomware Deployed Exploiting SQL Honeypots" (May 2024). Further coverage on Mallox ransomware operators abusing MS-SQL flaws.
*   [cite: 28] Futurism Technologies, "Mallox Ransomware: A New Nightmare for MS-SQL Servers". Covers TargetCompany's 174% increase in activity terminating SQL services and encrypting data.
*   [cite: 29] LevelBlue, "Inside a Mallox Ransomware Attack" (August 2024). Detailed analysis of Mallox encrypting files with ChaCha20 and double extortion tactics.
*   [cite: 31] Intel471, "Understanding and Combating the BlueSky Ransomware Threat" (December 2023). BlueSky attacking public-facing MSSQL servers.
*   [cite: 6] The DFIR Report, "SQL Brute Force Leads to BlueSky Ransomware" (December 2023). Case study of access via MSSQL brute force moving to network-wide BlueSky deployment in under an hour.
*   [cite: 32] Thodex, "BlueSky Ransomware". Outlines BlueSky's use of Curve25519, ChaCha20, and NtSetInformationThread for evasion.
*   [cite: 34] Reddit /r/sysadmin, "SQL Brute Force Leads to BlueSky Ransomware" (December 2023). System administrator discussions surrounding the rapid deployment of BlueSky.
*   [cite: 33] AhnLab ASEC, "BlueSky Ransomware / Mallox" (April 2024). Links the TargetCompany threat group to Remcos RAT and remote screen control malware following SQL breaches.
*   [cite: 9] Varonis, "MongoBleed CVE-2025-14847 Memory Leak Vulnerability" (December 2025). Explains the root cause of the memory over-read in `message_compressor_zlib.cpp`.
*   [cite: 10] Axonius, "CVE-2025-14847-mongobleed" (December 2025). Provides remediation timelines and CVSS scoring details for self-managed MongoDB instances.
*   [cite: 11] Wiz.io, "MongoBleed CVE-2025-14847 Exploited in the Wild" (December 2025). Explains the "magic" OP_COMPRESSED packet wrapping valid minimal BSON to trigger the leak.
*   [cite: 25] Palo Alto Networks Unit42, "MongoBleed CVE-2025-14847" (January 2026). Explains the failure to validate the `uncompressedSize` field.
*   [cite: 39] Broadcom, "CVE-2025-14847 MongoBleed Vulnerability Exploited in the Wild" (January 2026). Confirms active exploitation and required patches.

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6. [thedfirreport.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQHopgh2OOC2RLrPagobE62JERPfmm5UkbpPP5GhUZKBPkwkpX8n9WIfS1g3B8Y_AfZyfhrtNM4W4Po1IQx4X56QvePklH1r3uSVunc6weEzBY5tZe7wae2EK1b-aOleliQm6k3EsY0XLDVhqntbSD-HWq0Qg_cK3NpoFIDEtaxXwacSgzTBtvA=)
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8. [sentinelone.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQFlIL6mMfDhEBk-ero8Qb3Ib_oAO_ir4wg9ghYELHfvUDFnvarRNYhYqog_2_drOicz1FJmMhCq3H3DhQ2hMgf0SAy6SnKudXzidlpJ9-TS2bqfP5GB7d-GPy5vR8JQj7W9Aaviyuh2FkTOh-JKcrgZHEHpRxgkMhQ=)
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10. [axonius.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQFJikkvrORbVAnugD6e1PLDeOJDVfHIZjsTtnT8CMG-BcVhfB9iyi1LwWLNdE0-1jKy0K4wcMfLZNwN9qDATXgbYKuqtTEzKAUPpYApx0veX2BvTY3HroIARfcOyx_ZzJUYeaY78WlXxFLxHek=)
11. [wiz.io](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQFGZxhQ6vhFg0985w_rR34QA9PogILBsCFeEzdIRbD4JHpY2wIYo727DreyIemZAbx3SXnoHwqBrKAoKp44GKh7-ap5kTKVx4yemk5sUS-b-7jThzL78qZ0RoIECDuBnmzR9nFAZPjRvBDhCsH5nXvG1xG3eVqxNBOLXR9GRhZL8rKL_a3e)
12. [computer.org](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQERf8FXO73Yx1fDgXDc37rDlRcKPDx7wk6DeBKZfwiEx2a4GYp8YAqvqnwyQH-np4fEN50PxNb5e7o4VXS4GdsHQ5-29nOq4IIWz-vNIfC2KwHZcSrREFpkvDQQNaqFx-MuBzNm16T1No7FYAWIo2AVwd49sb9-k6ngz_lqFQPepdHIskWSvG4=)
13. [wikipedia.org](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQGJ9JuJzbXPULOhBEuP_UGGWeGyUI_AeOQFpO3Hy8OQZM3UcPLBvi2abnZxaw-u8b-_AtVSwjyVNMAl8wn4-hjJpcceWiAJsB_J88v1HReaXJTRAmWvXGSz2_DLsbxUuDOE4Kw=)
14. [imperva.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQHDosGPCSzw6YCeSd7kcvfweZTHEzJ3C92lMXzKHrZzf3LCmX2XOPO3tK1KxoU3exzqRYb1W08H0KyNI1OYYG4jn6Sf7FIt0jKmJ8ByhbBRj65kM8BPIqAKqtIoSWuJsdtLZGajVSKA08UBkW3ArIqsGXJYuc2-)
15. [substack.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQHO_XuriSvd1gRw3F3Cp0XcUNQn6ubBw5CE82l_3zS3g1Wvs07R5tGnqAZ9Rw-vTa_2EbxAwY5CeUbO8ZqBwHp3nbWnZ1T3X5uUO68DbH-A-iYJwDA3EnLoP3ELcjBwgcNg1YHqJkfXdfWf0NPwkTwFaG2zLJOcQnDV)
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20. [cloudflare.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQF372_njvIWG5fb33rnWTLOBc9EYT0X_4SevAzeWppROP5K0x-DIDGFw-V0GqhUID2bq1GlQZqrm0C-WGlCXn2TkW7SxHDSaflz_VGpFzeLRkVtH2lVyIt5-qEY_XXXW1hJnIjC9QJkO3VF9PAZ6l-gj5DGXug=)
21. [sans.edu](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQHeDproWqb_vVfO03yZ3iAOr76ZCfNAnoBAneJGrjtepwTYreXOY9Z4X95abK3LkqvTinBjiNGGl2yYvUyd1HLwnosac86CeMhrx4yQnaSOl2Zk526P5w==)
22. [xmcyber.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQGKudqWuOSTA1SZe7Ql1ZloMU8oBFekrxBfmfDRDuUM-mfhki886IDWIhlodhB9qQy4E-xXx2yUMaxuyVBsQ4ZsNlC0Dwkw1IMjD89PRQve36QgHCLPcQcmtzcj15xG7xrGqhH1lrMtDRlTVFg0FrToxuXAEg8gsOqtkp-HG3HqzNCQ2P4f0x1SNiDRO9SRp3G1kS-ZnTvfiT5xOf3WQA==)
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25. [paloaltonetworks.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQE0EkDlTtbchZVJHD0ccn3Lv5jrGU5wNN5rEQahLQ6fci_A8MRVErcLu5wUanAshuzLepM5rlWrJiYWDgxzha0jv-8VdOFw_47AysurDl4XBp63Uii2HDLIkVWXfbKNKczHz7on8r60jLm3D6hUoWcXUgAvuw==)
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27. [ncsc.gov.ie](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQGP8h68c8RwLUYtp__Eix-4ZyxKrjFOMibLjYlCV2CyPL8edKIlPpsVog2clK9lnDGlvmJ6fFWm2sY5vUr8dYvDiI549wXzHXVT5KlgAu3_4KUZ29qVMcMOkVAfxczJbJ6-mLL7GULjZaVGsqU=)
28. [futurismtechnologies.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQGyqitfGAMUc7fZJLJ4wr4b_5LreC4SV8Ir7azILGbSL0rLNjXklprGRZyDAB0VyV6I99Dc6EiFaoT1V29zWWEjo0uWIPpL06_ianeQcOQy-XabWKxcNHrL4iRYZw6dX8CeMkiOzdsVZw6sTtg2BitcXpiXQmqJm7O-83uPlSni2uylKl3HevTbbJUP74ldvMoQWRnJrA==)
29. [levelblue.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQEMDx31Qpi6uaBqHPD8k-AnSqEMSpdLuZnu-PNiBiecqSkgMOIBGEzawfqB97ymtzELgphJ-4OWzbQKeyDK6iJ6wdqb8Pi5318qpNZKIYeuoEs_7RAl2otfbyHLwDIb0gJbUmwHcQXMyqno7LN3AWM12dCWhBokRoeMOAffCar3KQxXF6pN4rhvzv8eXDb3bjUDnQajaZc8wW8FQ3Bf)
30. [thecyberthrone.in](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQF9rEzxHJ0Jsrb9PVrS5_5LOiRjxg4ejrc5DsMReRJ0LV0OnRhfKulegHZ-j8SriZnaR-_tojP5_6DL63IIfpFgmu8RUOfhGkex0G17O2OVhwCGkD-mQ7eZnPIYho6h_8WKiKbiZuQt7t1tAR27ud1JlxDL1bcBpfFK7-mEsbgNA88yIXuK5qlboEVBYwXphA==)
31. [intel471.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQHcdNC5Zp302IykGuJJEldOcswaslv6jjKTTZu-Y4HEJ1lgLtOycLy2fzaQ_Vcjk68LTg7cimfxIyMGZV3FsPePhpct_n3Om-kKmq1ZbL18XK4XRisiGlB6-X9PyOcttXsMsU1TXdd1qdHjn9WO-IYkJYPl24OpOdqQ1Jb5YsiAppAdqi-_DCynMrfQgSM=)
32. [thodex.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQHxu1a_UAbWVb0qJjjXs3EE7OvFVt1Ia3k7EAa2a159df5D4gycxdIwexoCaaBxAGuVWAZS3L2nHLcZL58-UuEpzhVPbJM7KBBANqSGlqbD1eMfH4SopW6ChueKXbkzpIc=)
33. [ahnlab.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQGHmXLeqrvebkaVbS-5he_DDVawAtKXIY3kLdpG_M2ejgAsk-1tjx9OBy3Ii81DWgIRNbUkg5Glydv5thlVxFkRRUaOAKwm_NWwFIQJ9xD94PTuBWrS0Rg=)
34. [reddit.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQE835DD5Vb4meTx4PJf6oRj4xP_uMhXevRwMwjQ0Ve4zlrgEG_1rEsJq6rzeIjEcswfsCUwkOAK9Q7DmIIq-QQUf99Pb1YaRe9gHv4gQJAesvkd9MoYpBafbnLqdK_WCOlZNJKm1PgBzCKahPKujSEKav8TduY1vgQnqzLhG3po9f9KV2V7lhGzN8sPqozaEJziJHL-Uw==)
35. [f5.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQHByJiVVr9pK9veODlzh9wCYHmz_KDgcKqonkaF13HflYvoC8xANSWWpgL7QPzUapLeshEdCedIqgL7sZIcftBY1CBCK8MtfGHzv1ps_Wj-ulGK4YYGWlRBhVIJMVIKDDYNnnwdTIgLyZ9rx8vW5W1r0oWyzX44nJ_2j0bSJQubzjosAdXKmG-5FQilXt78ADesvGDq1A==)
36. [theseus.fi](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQEWtdDAWk01fGcxbQXepPdZRyRGD1-FKMaJWNRSEfxWB0TneLNxyB4_ioXIQesvgLuPAD3QihXGxpVy6QQXMCZgPHGjYPoSIu3q6phBg5KGxdC8ydHIjUiW4Hg8xWTSJOf_7oMHq4IJiu7_ohhASoFK-vz4QIrO)
37. [imaging.org](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQGsA-QHj-25FsmkLtKpwm7SSoriSmDydsDTTziQN8pE3RMdStYIBv7pkW0tnQ2pUPAaPR3qSLj0JjsGRBwUCTIG8s58jhhNdNJTCGVkM80uB0Ams9dz7mtZKw8_ku-pGHz_A23EyFI_a6wrkwekb-asUYjZc0ZaGxZCdo8x792xD1LEN2Spria9OvOXirH7fmyfcDbq)
38. [github.io](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQHcbVP4YFsNRHXMCCDdL-562QuzkAi0NxQcrQNxju3nHC1VM3TuMMnnnEJb7tV8Fmi1Wu2KsTyOoInE9ebtntdPbaWq7tKCKVV-o0MSE_iaSQsrFfZSLUJ-knbi-woMECA65dLkGsEMYfjLDgPWMSDJWMsCufWFrT5v5w==)
39. [broadcom.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQH0hLeVNYgYJbXR0-hB4xNnCkLS7KZPqhyRX7-xyiFG7sJhSgJ043d3JY4xwQPUSjS9pHQJhFc4YtLZ9KdyM1O5oXCCkmS7_87_ZWe1gVdrgN5UKSS5rV2kCql7bdwIhmw5CBFUNCFE-5-4bWIOyEynHTSel8g_z3xh8LdIdYR6cH64freRyGNXLaEI_CZLFsnLuc5RI-TV9uELdMYhGvjTXIbEI20YVuSVkyh3GACtGq7yLjVQRW_qZA==)